This is helpful, although, as the discussion here already indicates, it might say a bit more about hybrid approaches, as I suspect that most thinkers make use of a blend of a number of these approaches, with one generally predominating. While it is useful to separate these approaches in order to clearly identify them, they are by no means exclusive, and at least some of them seem to me to be pretty clearly complementary. My own approach is probably a blend of coherentism with foundationalism and evidentialism (as most clearly evidenced in the conclusion of my conversion to Orthodox Christianity, “It Fits!”: https://ehewlett.net/oldsite/orthodox/oc_blovd.htm#ItFits). While I think your article implies that our thinking is often a blend of these approaches with one predominating, I don’t see that actually articulated anywhere in it.
The overall point that the search for truth is far more complex than just a search for an array of the strongest of arguments is well-made, though, which is why “winning the debate” rarely results in a radical shift in understanding. I’ve personally found losing a debate to be far more profitable!
Minor point: As a stickler for spelling, bugs me a little that Coherentism is misspelled in the central bulleted list!
As always, very good points Father! Blending different theories does work for sure, but I guess here I was interested in what justification ultimately comes down to. Within coherentism, consideration is given to evidence based claims and to foundational beliefs. But yes I agree, the search for truth is complex and multifaceted and we ought not be overly confident about our frameworks for persuing it 😁
So, if coherentism takes into account evidence-based claims and foundational beliefs, does anyone ever actually adopt a purely foundationalist or evidentialist approach? Or is your overall point not merely that you are a coherentist, but that we almost all are? I wouldn't necessarily disagree with that - especially post-Post-modernism! - but that does make the presentation of foundationalism, evidentialism, etc. here seem a bit straw-mannish. But I'm not up-to-date enough on my philosophy (mostly stopped paying attention after Plato and St. Justin, with a little deconstructionist reading thrown in thanks to my many-years-ago graduate-leval course in literary critical theory) to know whether that's the currently the case in philosophical circles.
I think here it's helpful to distinguish between justification and knowledge more broadly. Generally (Gettier cases notwithstanding), knowledge is justified true belief. Coherentism is a theory of justification, not necessarily of knowledge more broadly. So in my broader epistemological theory I can include foundational and evidence based beliefs, when I'm asking what the bare minimum is for justification, I don't think anything is necessary other than coherance. Hopefully I'm making sense and speaking accurately 😅
Can I posit that you are suggesting that a coherentist also has foundational beliefs, but is willing to exchange them if that brings more coherence?
However, if they are also open to exchanging their foundational belief in coherentism, then it seems to leave things in a wonderfully metastable state.
(I'm a coherentist, by the way - at least for now!)
In my opinion this is a very comprehensive overview of one of the hardest problems I see in the way truth or arguments for truth are often presented. I also see the importance of including spiritual experiences and beliefs into this discussion which is often left aside. I think that a phenomenological approach to truth can be very useful. I know a philosopher who promotes the phenomenological method to try to understand the way a specific person comes to her conclusions about what is the truth. This method also forces us to recognize how the worldview of a specific person comes into being. This person feels respected and heard. This can open up new space for a more open exploration of what may be the best ground to find out what truth can be. In my experience this is not easy to get to, but it seems the best chance to change the mostly unproductive discourse between opposing worldviews.
Arguments are like incense at vespers. They smell nice, they frame the ritual, but nobody walks out believing in God just because the smoke curled logically. Belief is born in the gut and the bones, then reason waddles in afterward to draft the paperwork. I like that you’re reminding philosophy it has poets, mystics, and tricksters in the family too. Otherwise it just turns into math class with fancier robes.
Check out Antonio Damasio's 'The Strange Order of Things'. Got some interesting ideas about feelings, emotions, and evolution. Can't attest to their validity, but fascinating nonetheless!
"The scientific consensus is that, contrary to the claims of the enlightenment, we are not nearly as rational as we like to think."
I don't think there is actually much that is rational about enlightenment or frankly humanity in general. Our greatest and worst moments tend to run counter to what most would probably consider rationality.
I do have to say that for veganism the problem isn’t often premises exactly. It’s more typically consistency of premises. Anyways, what you say seems true for philosophical arguments for sure. Often I find “strong” arguments others make completely ridiculous immediately after reading the premises lol.
I just read Florensky’s chapter on doubt from the pillar and ground of truth which analyzes two types of knowledge and rejects them as insufficient, motivating a knowledge of divine trinity as being an answer to their flaws. The two types of knowledge he lists are “self-evident” intuitions corresponding to empirical/logical/experiential brute “givens” (the senses are, the laws of logic are, mystical nondual experience is) and discursive reasoning. He seems to think that trinity allows for valid knowledge through something akin to the identity of identity and difference where A is A because A is united with not A. According to him this requires both not A to be its own subsistence but also not not A thus “returning” to A. It’s an interesting argument!
Another very interesting read - thank you for taking the time to lay this out so clearly! However, I do have a couple questions, if you feel like responding to them :) Mainly regarding "justification."
"Justification in epistemology is the attempt to determine upon what basis a person ought to be believe something...."
Is there really any value in this idea of "justification?" In other words, does it really make sense to deliberate the reasons that someone "ought (not)" to believe something? You clarify:
"... whether or not the person in question has succeeded epistemically to sufficiently support their own beliefs."
Either someone believes a proposition or they don't. If they do believe it, then they will feel "justified" in believing the proposition (they will feel they have epistemically succeeded to sufficiently support their belief). If they did NOT feel justified (i.e. epistemically successful), then they would NOT believe it.
It doesn't matter what (thought and/or non-thought) process they employed to reach the belief. Once they reach a point of "belief," then anything we call "justification" will fall in place if it wasn't already the process that led to that belief in the first place.
If a person believes in a proposition, is there any ground to stand on to say they "ought not" to believe it? They DO believe it, so any notion of "ought not" is purely hypothetical. Such a notion might be of value if you were in a position to converse with a person and had a chance of changing their mind. But any approach of "you ought not" will likely close the door to the possibility of them changing their mind.
Similarly if a person rejects a proposition, is there any ground to stand on to say they "ought" to believe it? The simple fact is they DON'T believe it. Again any notion of "ought" is purely hypothetical.
Is there really any value in these conceptual exercises of "justification?" It seems to me that the only thing that matters is from your own subjective viewpoint to consider what evidence/propositions/arguments matter to you in your personal epistemic deliberations. There is no "ought (not)" in that process; just possibilities and choices. And everyone is in that exact same position :)
If you feel like sharing any thoughts, I'd love to hear them! Regardless, thank you again for your great, thought-provoking articles!
Thanks for your kinds words and questions Lance! I would say that, just like morality, there is only value in the discussion if the other person cares about truth to the extent they are willing to examine their beliefs and question whether or not they are really justified in holding them. If someone doesn't care about this, there's nothing you can do to convince them it's important. In my opinion, any "ought" is conditional in the sense that it only works IF someone is interested in that consideration in the first place.
That makes perfect sense, thank you for the clarification! And keep up the great work :)
Please let me know if you'd ever have the time and inclination to discuss these matters in more detail; I think such a conversation would be tremendously interesting and a lot of fun! Wishing you all the best!
This is helpful, although, as the discussion here already indicates, it might say a bit more about hybrid approaches, as I suspect that most thinkers make use of a blend of a number of these approaches, with one generally predominating. While it is useful to separate these approaches in order to clearly identify them, they are by no means exclusive, and at least some of them seem to me to be pretty clearly complementary. My own approach is probably a blend of coherentism with foundationalism and evidentialism (as most clearly evidenced in the conclusion of my conversion to Orthodox Christianity, “It Fits!”: https://ehewlett.net/oldsite/orthodox/oc_blovd.htm#ItFits). While I think your article implies that our thinking is often a blend of these approaches with one predominating, I don’t see that actually articulated anywhere in it.
The overall point that the search for truth is far more complex than just a search for an array of the strongest of arguments is well-made, though, which is why “winning the debate” rarely results in a radical shift in understanding. I’ve personally found losing a debate to be far more profitable!
Minor point: As a stickler for spelling, bugs me a little that Coherentism is misspelled in the central bulleted list!
As always, very good points Father! Blending different theories does work for sure, but I guess here I was interested in what justification ultimately comes down to. Within coherentism, consideration is given to evidence based claims and to foundational beliefs. But yes I agree, the search for truth is complex and multifaceted and we ought not be overly confident about our frameworks for persuing it 😁
So, if coherentism takes into account evidence-based claims and foundational beliefs, does anyone ever actually adopt a purely foundationalist or evidentialist approach? Or is your overall point not merely that you are a coherentist, but that we almost all are? I wouldn't necessarily disagree with that - especially post-Post-modernism! - but that does make the presentation of foundationalism, evidentialism, etc. here seem a bit straw-mannish. But I'm not up-to-date enough on my philosophy (mostly stopped paying attention after Plato and St. Justin, with a little deconstructionist reading thrown in thanks to my many-years-ago graduate-leval course in literary critical theory) to know whether that's the currently the case in philosophical circles.
I think here it's helpful to distinguish between justification and knowledge more broadly. Generally (Gettier cases notwithstanding), knowledge is justified true belief. Coherentism is a theory of justification, not necessarily of knowledge more broadly. So in my broader epistemological theory I can include foundational and evidence based beliefs, when I'm asking what the bare minimum is for justification, I don't think anything is necessary other than coherance. Hopefully I'm making sense and speaking accurately 😅
Speaking, but not spelling! ;-)
Can I posit that you are suggesting that a coherentist also has foundational beliefs, but is willing to exchange them if that brings more coherence?
However, if they are also open to exchanging their foundational belief in coherentism, then it seems to leave things in a wonderfully metastable state.
(I'm a coherentist, by the way - at least for now!)
Yep pretty much 😁
I might subscribe to a kind of Hybrid: Coherentist Infinitism 😊
I think that reason is nested in a way that follows infintism. but those reasons have to coherently match ^^
Makes sense :)
That is a beautiful foundation!
In my opinion this is a very comprehensive overview of one of the hardest problems I see in the way truth or arguments for truth are often presented. I also see the importance of including spiritual experiences and beliefs into this discussion which is often left aside. I think that a phenomenological approach to truth can be very useful. I know a philosopher who promotes the phenomenological method to try to understand the way a specific person comes to her conclusions about what is the truth. This method also forces us to recognize how the worldview of a specific person comes into being. This person feels respected and heard. This can open up new space for a more open exploration of what may be the best ground to find out what truth can be. In my experience this is not easy to get to, but it seems the best chance to change the mostly unproductive discourse between opposing worldviews.
Could not agree more!
Arguments are like incense at vespers. They smell nice, they frame the ritual, but nobody walks out believing in God just because the smoke curled logically. Belief is born in the gut and the bones, then reason waddles in afterward to draft the paperwork. I like that you’re reminding philosophy it has poets, mystics, and tricksters in the family too. Otherwise it just turns into math class with fancier robes.
Well put 😁
Check out Antonio Damasio's 'The Strange Order of Things'. Got some interesting ideas about feelings, emotions, and evolution. Can't attest to their validity, but fascinating nonetheless!
I shall check it out, thanks for the recommendation bro 😁
"The scientific consensus is that, contrary to the claims of the enlightenment, we are not nearly as rational as we like to think."
I don't think there is actually much that is rational about enlightenment or frankly humanity in general. Our greatest and worst moments tend to run counter to what most would probably consider rationality.
Agreed!
I do have to say that for veganism the problem isn’t often premises exactly. It’s more typically consistency of premises. Anyways, what you say seems true for philosophical arguments for sure. Often I find “strong” arguments others make completely ridiculous immediately after reading the premises lol.
I just read Florensky’s chapter on doubt from the pillar and ground of truth which analyzes two types of knowledge and rejects them as insufficient, motivating a knowledge of divine trinity as being an answer to their flaws. The two types of knowledge he lists are “self-evident” intuitions corresponding to empirical/logical/experiential brute “givens” (the senses are, the laws of logic are, mystical nondual experience is) and discursive reasoning. He seems to think that trinity allows for valid knowledge through something akin to the identity of identity and difference where A is A because A is united with not A. According to him this requires both not A to be its own subsistence but also not not A thus “returning” to A. It’s an interesting argument!
Yeah I've heard of his ontology- it's definitely interesting!
This brings Meno's Paradox to mind.
Another very interesting read - thank you for taking the time to lay this out so clearly! However, I do have a couple questions, if you feel like responding to them :) Mainly regarding "justification."
"Justification in epistemology is the attempt to determine upon what basis a person ought to be believe something...."
Is there really any value in this idea of "justification?" In other words, does it really make sense to deliberate the reasons that someone "ought (not)" to believe something? You clarify:
"... whether or not the person in question has succeeded epistemically to sufficiently support their own beliefs."
Either someone believes a proposition or they don't. If they do believe it, then they will feel "justified" in believing the proposition (they will feel they have epistemically succeeded to sufficiently support their belief). If they did NOT feel justified (i.e. epistemically successful), then they would NOT believe it.
It doesn't matter what (thought and/or non-thought) process they employed to reach the belief. Once they reach a point of "belief," then anything we call "justification" will fall in place if it wasn't already the process that led to that belief in the first place.
If a person believes in a proposition, is there any ground to stand on to say they "ought not" to believe it? They DO believe it, so any notion of "ought not" is purely hypothetical. Such a notion might be of value if you were in a position to converse with a person and had a chance of changing their mind. But any approach of "you ought not" will likely close the door to the possibility of them changing their mind.
Similarly if a person rejects a proposition, is there any ground to stand on to say they "ought" to believe it? The simple fact is they DON'T believe it. Again any notion of "ought" is purely hypothetical.
Is there really any value in these conceptual exercises of "justification?" It seems to me that the only thing that matters is from your own subjective viewpoint to consider what evidence/propositions/arguments matter to you in your personal epistemic deliberations. There is no "ought (not)" in that process; just possibilities and choices. And everyone is in that exact same position :)
If you feel like sharing any thoughts, I'd love to hear them! Regardless, thank you again for your great, thought-provoking articles!
Thanks for your kinds words and questions Lance! I would say that, just like morality, there is only value in the discussion if the other person cares about truth to the extent they are willing to examine their beliefs and question whether or not they are really justified in holding them. If someone doesn't care about this, there's nothing you can do to convince them it's important. In my opinion, any "ought" is conditional in the sense that it only works IF someone is interested in that consideration in the first place.
That makes perfect sense, thank you for the clarification! And keep up the great work :)
Please let me know if you'd ever have the time and inclination to discuss these matters in more detail; I think such a conversation would be tremendously interesting and a lot of fun! Wishing you all the best!
Of course, feel free to PM me whenever :)